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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
 
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA  
 
SAN JOSE DIVISION 
 
 
 
IN RE: GOOGLE INC. GMAIL LITIGATION   
_______________________________________
 
THIS DOCUMENT RELATES TO: 
ALL ACTIONS 
            
)
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
)
Case No.: 5:13-MD-2430-LHK
 
 
ORDER DENYING DEFENDANT’S 
MOTION FOR § 1292(b) 
CERTIFICATION FOR 
INTERLOCUTORY REVIEW 
  
On September 26, 2013, this Court granted in part and denied in part Defendant Google’s 
Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs’ Consolidated Complaint in this multi-district litigation. See ECF No. 
69 (“September 26, 2013 Order”). Google filed a Motion for § 1292(b) Certification for 
Interlocutory Review of this Court’s September 26, 2013 Order. See ECF No. 80 (“Section 1292(b) 
Certification Motion”). Plaintiffs filed an Opposition. See ECF No. 83. This Court held a hearing 
on the Section 1292(b) Certification Motion on October 29, 2013. See ECF No. 94. Having 
considered the parties’ filings, arguments at the hearing, and the relevant law, the Court, in its 
discretion, DENIES Google’s Section 1292(b) Certification Motion.  
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I.  LEGAL STANDARD 
A district court may, in its discretion, certify an interlocutory order in a civil action for 
appellate review when the court is of “the opinion that such order involves a controlling question of 
law as to which there is substantial ground for difference of opinion and that an immediate appeal 
from the order may materially advance the ultimate termination of the litigation.” 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1292(b). “[T]he legislative history of 1292(b) indicates that this section was to be used only in 
exceptional situations in which allowing an interlocutory appeal would avoid protracted and 
expensive litigation.” In re Cement Antitrust Litig., 673 F.2d 1020, 1026 (9th Cir. 1982). “Section 
1292(b) is a departure from the normal rule that only final judgments are appealable, and therefore 
must be construed narrowly.” James v. Price Stern Sloan, Inc., 283 F.3d 1064, 1068 n.6 (9th Cir. 
2002). 
II.  DISCUSSION 
The Court here finds that the immediate appeal of the September 26, 2013 Order will not 
“materially advance the termination of the litigation.” 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b). The Court notes that 
this litigation is unlike other cases in which little to no discovery has occurred prior to the motion 
to dismiss. In fact, the oldest case in the instant multi-district litigation has been pending for more 
than three years. Furthermore, in that case, Google had an opportunity to seek appellate review of a 
May 23, 2011 order rejecting Google’s motion to dismiss based on Google’s consent and ordinary 
course of business exception arguments, the same arguments that are the subject of this Court’s 
September 26, 2013 Order, but Google chose not to do so. The long and tortuous procedural 
history of this litigation, as set forth below, demonstrates why further delaying this three-year-old 
litigation for immediate appellate review is unwarranted.  
The first case that makes up this multi-district litigation, Dunbar v. Google, was filed on 
November 17, 2010, in the Eastern District of Texas. See Dunbar v. Google, Inc. (“Dunbar I”), No. 
10-CV-194, ECF No. 61 (E.D. Tex. May 23, 2011). Google moved to dismiss the complaint on 
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February 4, 2011, see Dunbar I, ECF No. 13 (E.D. Tex. Feb. 4, 2011), but Plaintiffs amended their 
complaint, see Dunbar I, ECF No. 17 (E.D. Tex. Feb. 21, 2011), thereby mooting the initial motion 
to dismiss. Google subsequently moved to dismiss the amended complaint on March 10, 2011, see 
Dunbar I, ECF No. 23 (E.D. Tex. March 10, 2011). Google’s motion to dismiss was based on the 
“ordinary course of business” and consent exceptions to the Wiretap Act, the same exceptions at 
issue in this Court’s September 26, 2013 Order. See id. at 7-11 (“Scanning in the Ordinary Course 
of Business is Excluded From Liability Under the Wiretap Act” and “The Alleged Interception Is 
Lawful Because the Gmail Account Holder Consents”). While the motion was being briefed, 
discovery commenced. See Dunbar I, ECF Nos. 42 & 43 (E.D. Tex. April 20, 2011). 
After full briefing, on May 23, 2011, Judge Folsom denied in full Google’s motion to 
dismiss. See Dunbar I, ECF No. 61 (E.D. Tex. May 23, 2011). Judge Folsom rejected Google’s 
contention that Gmail users had consented to the interceptions. Judge Folsom ruled that at the 
pleading stage, he could not conclude that Gmail users had consented to the specific alleged 
interceptions at issue in the case. Id. at 6-7. Moreover, Judge Folsom rejected Google’s “ordinary 
course of business” argument, holding that “[t]he applicability of the ‘ordinary course of business’ 
exception . . . cannot be resolved at the pleading stage.” Id. Google did not, however, move for 
section 1292(b) certification of Judge Folsom’s May 23, 2011 order despite the fact that the case at 
the time was only six months old, and the parties had not accrued substantial litigation expenses. 
After the unappealed May 23, 2011 motion to dismiss order, discovery accelerated in 
Dunbar. The parties exchanged discovery and filed various discovery motions. In an August 17, 
2011 scheduling order, Judge Folsom indicated that Google had produced 28,000 pages of 
documents and then subsequently produced 706,000 pages of discovery. See Dunbar I, ECF No. 87 
(E.D. Tex. Aug. 17, 2011). Judge Folsom further set a deadline of October 25, 2011 for class 
discovery with a hearing on class certification set for December 8, 2011. See id.  
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The parties proceeded on this schedule, taking substantial discovery in the lead up to the 
class certification hearing. After the hearing, on March 16, 2012, Judge Folsom entered an order 
denying Plaintiffs’ class certification motion without prejudice. See Dunbar I, ECF No. 156 (E.D. 
Tex. March 16, 2012). On April 20, 2012, Google filed another motion to dismiss. See Dunbar I, 
ECF No. 160 (E.D. Tex. April 20, 2012). In the alternative Google requested that the case be 
transferred to the Northern District of California. See id. The motion to transfer was granted, and 
the case was transferred to this Court and assigned to the undersigned judge on June 27, 2012. See 
Dunbar v. Google, Inc. (“Dunbar II”), No. 12-3305, ECF No. 180 (N.D. Cal. July 23, 2012). 
This Court held an initial Case Management Conference after transfer on August 29, 2012. 
At that conference, though the Court declined to set a full case schedule, the Court explicitly noted 
that “[d]iscovery may proceed as to Plaintiff’s individual claims as set forth in the Second 
Amended Class Action Compliant.” See Dunbar II, ECF No. 207 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 30, 2012). The 
day after the conference, Plaintiff moved for leave to amend the complaint and indicated his intent 
to file a renewed class certification motion. See Dunbar II, ECF No. 205 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 28, 
2012). After full briefing, this Court granted the motion for leave to amend. See Dunbar II, ECF 
No. 226 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 12, 2012).1 The Court found that Plaintiff had been diligent since Judge 
Folsom’s denial of the initial class certification motion and that Google would not be unduly 
prejudiced by amendment because the Court would not reopen class discovery. Id. at 17-25. 
Thereafter, Plaintiff filed a Third Amended Complaint, which Google did not move to dismiss. See 
                                                          
1 The Court’s order also contained a detailed discussion of the discovery that had already been 
undertaken. The Court noted that Plaintiff had sought information regarding Plaintiff’s email 
account in May 2011, which Google had not produced. See Dunbar II, ECF No. 226 at 3-5 (N.D. 
Cal. Dec. 12, 2012). Yet, at a subsequent meet and confer, Google’s counsel indicated that 
Plaintiff’s emails were scanned, which suggested that Google had this information. See id. 
Nonetheless, in December 2012, Google had not produced the information, and Plaintiff filed a 
motion to compel, which Judge Grewal granted on January 8, 2013. See id. at 18-19; Dunbar II, 
ECF No. 244 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 8, 2013) (order granting in part motion to compel). Judge Grewal 
ordered that all materials that were the subject of his order be produced by January 25, 2013. See 
Dunbar II, ECF No. 244 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 8, 2013).  
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Dunbar II, ECF No. 228 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 14, 2013). Rather, Google answered the Third Amended 
complaint. See Dunbar II, ECF No. 246 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 14, 2013). 
On January 8, 2013, this Court held a further case management conference and set a 
briefing schedule on Plaintiff’s class certification motion. See Dunbar II, ECF No. 242 (N.D. Cal. 
Jan. 8, 2013). Under that scheduling order, Plaintiff’s deadline to file a class certification motion 
was January 28, 2013, Defendant’s opposition was due on March 7, 2013, and Plaintiff’s reply was 
due on March 28, 2013. See id. The class certification motion was fully briefed pursuant to this 
scheduling order. See Dunbar II, ECF No. 249 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 28, 2013) (motion); Dunbar II, ECF 
No. 261 (N.D. Cal. March 7, 2013) (opposition); Dunbar II, ECF No. 269 (N.D. Cal. March 28, 
2013) (reply). 
While Dunbar was pending, five other actions involving substantially similar allegations 
against Google were filed in this District and throughout the country. See Scott, et al. v. Google, 
Inc., No. 12-3413 (N.D. Cal.); Scott v. Google, Inc., No. 12-614 (N.D. Fla.); A.K. v. Google, Inc., 
No. 12-1179 (S.D. Ill.); Knowles v. Google, Inc., No. 12-2022 (D. Md.); Brinkman v. Google, Inc., 
No. 12-6699 (E.D. Pa.). On April 1, 2013, the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation issued a 
Transfer Order, centralizing Dunbar along with the five other actions in the Northern District of 
California before the undersigned judge. See ECF No. 1. At an initial case management conference 
on April 19, 2013, the Court ordered Plaintiffs to file a consolidated complaint on May 16, 2013, 
and set the briefing schedule for any motion to dismiss and scheduled a hearing for September 5, 
2013. See ECF No. 9. The Court also set a briefing schedule on Plaintiffs’ Motion for Class 
Certification and scheduled a hearing for January 16, 2014. See id. On May 6, 2013, this Court 
related a seventh action, Fread v. Google, Inc., No. 13-1961 (N.D. Cal.), as part of this multi-
district litigation. See ECF No. 29. 
In line with the Court’s scheduling order, Plaintiffs filed a Consolidated Complaint on May 
16, 2013. See ECF No. 38. Google filed a Motion to Dismiss the Consolidated Complaint on June 
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13, 2013. See ECF No. 44. Plaintiffs filed their opposition to Google’s Motion to Dismiss on July 
11, 2013. See ECF No. 53. Google filed a reply on July 29, 2013. See ECF No. 56. This Court held 
a hearing on the Motion to Dismiss on September 5, 2013. See ECF No. 64. The Court issued an 
Order Granting in Part and Denying in Part the Motion to Dismiss on September 26, 2013. See 
ECF No. 69.2 
On October 2, 2013, the Court issued a further scheduling order, which maintained the 
dates for class certification briefing and added deadlines for fact and expert discovery, along with 
deadlines for dispositive motions and scheduled a pretrial conference for September 25, 2014, and 
trial for October 20, 2014. See ECF No. 76. Subsequently, Plaintiff filed a Motion for Class 
Certification, which has been fully briefed in accordance with the Court’s schedule. ECF Nos. 87, 
101, 112. The Court intends to rule on Plaintiffs’ Motion for Class Certification shortly.  
In light of this procedural history, the Court notes that this is not a case in which the parties 
have yet to accrue substantial litigation expenses that can be avoided by immediate appeal. Rather, 
multiple motions to dismiss have been fully briefed, argued, and ruled upon; multiple motions for 
class certification have been fully briefed; class discovery had closed in one of the cases more than 
two years ago; and fact discovery on the merits is set to close in less than three months. Due to the 
                                                          
2 One of the critical issues decided in this Court’s September 26, 2013 Order was the scope of the 
“ordinary course of business” exception to the Wiretap Act, under which the use of any “telephone 
or telegraph instrument, equipment or facility, or any component thereof . . . being used by a 
provider of wire or electronic communication service in the ordinary course of its business” is not 
prohibited. 18 U.S.C. § 2510(5)(a)(ii). This Court narrowly construed the exception, because inter 
alia it found that the word “ordinary” limited the exception because the modifier signaled that “not 
everything that a company may want to do falls within the ‘ordinary course of business’ 
exception,” and because Google’s interceptions violated Google’s own internal policies. September 
26, 2013 Order at 14, 20-21. Multiple definitions of the “ordinary course of business” have been 
proposed. For example, Plaintiffs propose the definition of “necessary” to providing the electronic 
communication service. Google proposes “within customary and routine business practices.” This 
Court’s September 26, 2013 Order held that an interception must be “instrumental” to the provision 
of the electronic communication services to fall within the “ordinary course of business” exception. 
Regardless of which definition is adopted, the Court finds that factual development would be 
necessary in determining whether Google’s interceptions fall within the “ordinary course of 
business” exception. For example, the Court cannot determine based on the pleadings alone what is 
“necessary,” “customary or routine,” or “instrumental” to Google’s business.  
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considerable expenses that have already accrued and the fact that the current case schedule 
contemplates trial in October 2014, the Court finds that termination of the litigation is more likely 
to be materially advanced by proceeding to final judgment.3   
III.  CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, the Court, in its discretion, DENIES Google’s Section 1292(b) 
Certification Motion.  
 
IT IS SO ORDERED. 
Dated:  January 27, 2014    _________________________________ 
 LUCY H. KOH 
 United States District Judge 
                                                          
3 Google contends that certification is warranted by the fact that appellate review will provide 
clarity not only in this litigation, but in other cases pending before the Court. However, the 
questions Google moves to certify do not address the thorny issues presented in other litigation 
pending before this Court. For example, Google does not move to certify the question whether the 
consent exception to the state anti-wiretapping laws compels dismissal of the complaint in the 
instant litigation. Determining whether the consent exception applies requires consideration of 
whether non-Gmail users who sent emails to Gmail users consented to Google’s interceptions 
despite the fact that non-Gmail users had not agreed to any of Google’s Terms of Service or 
Privacy Policies. See Fla. Stat. § 934.03(2)(d); Md. Code, Cts. & Jud. Proc. § 10-402(c)(3); 18 Pa. 
Cons. Stat. § 5704(4) (requiring that both parties to an interception consent for the consent 
exception to apply). The Court finds that certifying the September 26, 2013 Order for interlocutory 
review when Google does not seek appellate review of non-Gmail users’ consent would not 
advance Google’s stated goal in its Section 1292(b) Certification Motion of providing an 
authoritative decision that would have “important precedential value for other cases.” Section 
1292(b) Certification Motion at 10. This is so because other pending litigation, including the 
litigation related to the case Google cites, implicates the rights of non-users of electronic 
communication service providers. See Holland v. Yahoo!, Inc., No. 13-4980, ECF No. 1 ¶ 21 (N.D. 
Cal. Oct. 25, 2013). 
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